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ANTI-SLAVE-TRADE LAW, ‘LIBERATED
AFRICANS’ AND THE STATE IN THE
SOUTH ATLANTIC WORLD, C.1839–1852*
On 5 August 1844, six African men boarded HMS Helena to tell
Commander Cornwallis Ricketts that their lives were in danger.
‘They state themselves that they are slaves, and that they are in
bodily fear’. The six had embarked on the brig Unia˜o at
Mozambique Island, the capital of the Portuguese colonial
‘province’ of Mozambique. The Unia˜o had been sailing in the
‘Quillimane River’ when the Helena had intercepted it as a
suspected slave ship. Ricketts’s officers, together with those of a
fellow naval ship, HMS Bittern, then spent a week searching the
Unia˜o for signs of slave trading, and the men’s statement added to
the evidence.1 Through a translator, the six requested a transfer
to their captor’s ship.2 Ricketts agreed to accommodate the six on
the Bittern, and all three ships set course for Cape Town, where
Ricketts deposited the Unia˜o at the British–Portuguese Court of
Mixed Commission for adjudication. If the court condemned the
ship, Ricketts and his crew would pocket prize money for the value
of the ship, its fittings and equipment, and its human cargo. But the
court’s proceedings unfolded in a way that neither he nor anyone
else could have expected.
The six men on board the Unia˜o were part of a much larger
diaspora of ex-slaves rescued from the transatlantic slave trade in
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1 Entry for 5 Aug. 1844, ship log of HMS Helena, ADM 53/2619, UK National
Archives, London (hereafter UKNA).
2 In general, I have retained nineteenth-century spellings when quoting from
sources. ‘Quillimane’ is now ‘Quelimane’, the seaport and capital of Zambezia
Province, Mozambique. Archives of Cape Town Slave Trade Commission, papers
relating to vessels adjudicated — the Unia˜o [1844–1845], item 2, FO 312/37, UKNA.
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the nineteenth century. Between Britain’s legislative abolition of
the slave trade in 1807 and the actual ending of the trade sixty
years later, around 180,000 slaves were rescued, primarily when a
British naval ship, such as the Helena, intercepted the slave ship on
which they had been embarked.3 Several names for these ex-
slaves overlapped, such as ‘recaptives’, ‘captured Negroes’ and
‘emancipados’. But the overarching international framework that
tried to define who could be rescued — and how — named them
‘liberated Africans’.4
Since slaves were a type of commodity, the rescue missions
intervened in questions of ownership, and so the international
framework for suppressing the slave trade defined ‘liberated
Africans’ in terms of a change in legal possession. When a naval
patrol intercepted a slave ship, the slaves became ‘prize negroes’:
property of their captor with an exchange value.5 The captor then
deposited the slave ship at one of two kinds of court. A court of
mixed commission adjudicated when the nationality of a slave
ship corresponded to a co-signatory of a bilateral abolition
treaty with Britain, whereas a British vice-admiralty court
adjudicated when the nationality of a ship was indeterminate.6
The court, as representative of the sovereignty of Britain or of the
3 Daniel Domingues da Silva et al., ‘The Diaspora of Africans Liberated from Slave
Ships in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of African History, lv (2014).
4 Scholarship is divided on whether ‘Liberated’ or ‘liberated’ African is the most
appropriate term. There was a Liberated African Department in Sierra Leone. But
contemporary records varied regarding capitalization, and to avoid giving the
impression of a reified group, I choose ‘liberated African’.
5 I use the contemporary technical term ‘prize negro’ to refer to a captured slave who
has not been processed through a court procedure to confirm her status as a ‘liberated
African’, which I use when discussing recaptive slaves who have gone through that
process. In practice (as we will see with one of the cases discussed below), the
distinctions could be slight or non-existent. I use inverted commas for the first
usage of these phrases alone. Prize negroes were not ‘prize slaves’, which strictly
refers to slaves captured during wartime — see Kirsten McKenzie, citing the late
Patrick Harries, in Kirsten McKenzie, Imperial Underworld: An Escaped Convict and
the Transformation of the British Colonial Order (Cambridge, 2016), 105, n. 9. I use ‘anti-
slave-trade’ to refer to attitudes and actions that are aimed at suppressing the slave
trade; these attitudes and actions are not necessarily ‘abolitionist’, which additionally
made some provision for what would subsequently happen to the slaves subject to the
action/attitude.
6 Slaves also became liberated Africans after a shipwreck or when rescued from a
slave factory (i.e. trading post) by a military operation. But naval interceptions were by
far the most common form of intervention. This article does not address the question
of how the ‘nationality’ of a ship was determined; it depended on factors such as the
ship’s owner, crew, flag and papers, which did not necessarily indicate the same
nationality. On the courts more generally, see Leslie Bethell, ‘The Mixed
180 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 241
(cont. on p. 181)
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/241/1/179/5134187 by U
niversity of C
am
bridge user on 16 January 2019
treaty’s signatories, would pay prize money to buy the slaves and
then renounce ownership of them, thereby freeing them. The
slave trader was not necessarily punished: he was handed over
to his own nation’s jurisdiction.7 The liberated Africans became
apprentices for between three and fourteen years.
Studying the archives to ask what happened, and why, as the
liberated Africans negotiated their way through these myriad legal
processes provides a new way of thinking about enslavement and
abolition. Christopher Leslie Brown’s study of various anti-slave-
trade projects, such as the founding of colonial Sierra Leone,
focused attention on how abolitionists accumulated and spent
their ‘moral capital’.8 In turn, historians have revealed the
practical workings of anti-slave-trade activity, such as the social
history of the naval crews that intercepted the ships, the
bureaucracy of the prize money system, and the resettlement of
liberated Africans around the Atlantic world.9 The last decade
has also witnessed studies of how Britain’s anti-slave-trade and
anti-slavery agenda propelled a shift from maritime intervention
to territorial colonization in Africa.10 However, there has been
less focus on the history of the liberated Africans themselves.
Current scholarship divides between those who view the anti-
slave-trade naval patrols, treaties and settlement schemes as
ultimately attributing rights (even human rights) to these
(n. 6 cont.)
Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth
Century’, Journal of African History, vii (1966).
7 Lauren Benton, ‘Abolition and Imperial Law, 1790–1820’, Journal of Imperial
and Commonwealth History, xxxix (2011), 365.
8 Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism
(Chapel Hill, NC, 2006).
9 Robert Burroughs, ‘Eyes on the Prize: Journeys in Slave Ships Taken as Prizes by
the Royal Navy’, Slavery and Abolition, xxxi (2010); Padraic X. Scanlan, ‘The Rewards
of Their Exertions: Prize Money and British Abolitionism in Sierra Leone, 1808–
1823’, Past and Present, no. 225 (Nov. 2014); Richard Huzzey, ‘The Politics of
Slave-Trade Suppression’, in Richard Burroughs and Richard Huzzey (eds.), The
Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade: British Policies, Practices and Representations of
Naval Coercion (Manchester, 2015); da Silva et al., ‘Diaspora of Africans Liberated
from Slave Ships’.
10 Robin Law, ‘Abolition and Imperialism: International Law and the British
Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade’, in Derek R. Peterson (ed.), Abolitionism
and Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and the Atlantic (Athens, Ohio, 2010); Derek R.
Peterson, ‘Introduction: Abolitionism and Political Thought in Britain and East
Africa’, in Peterson (ed.), Abolitionism and Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and the
Atlantic; Richard Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian
Britain (Ithaca, NY, 2012).
181LAW, ‘LIBERATED AFRICANS’ AND THE STATE
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/241/1/179/5134187 by U
niversity of C
am
bridge user on 16 January 2019
recaptives, and those who focus on the ways in which the liberated
Africans suffered de facto re-enslavement, for example through
apprenticeship.11
The insight of scholars who have focused on slaves and the law
offers a promising route beyond this impasse in historians’
understanding of liberated Africans. Many scholars have
observed that the interactions of slaves with authorities were
based partly on their actual or aspirational legal status.12 The
outcome of the bilateral treaties was the possibility of making
claims based on the new legal status of being or becoming a
‘liberated African’. The treaties constructed this status through
comparisons to manumitted slaves or waged apprentices, but
nonetheless kept it legally distinct regarding processes of
identification, adjudication and assignment to apprenticeship.
Original archival research in Britain, South Africa and Brazil
reveals the fundamental ambiguity of the legal status of ‘liberated
Africans’. This ambiguity affected issues such as how British
imperial authorities expected its colonial governments and
other states’ governments to uphold ‘liberated African’ status,
to whom these governments were accountable, and the
processes by which the liberated Africans could fulfil their
actual or aspirational status. By seeing how anti-slave-trade law
came alive through the actions and interpretations of state
officials, this article argues that the ambiguous legal status
gave states and hirers the opportunity to exploit liberated
11 On human rights, see Jenny S. Martinez, ‘Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of
International Human Rights Law’, Yale Law Journal, cxvii (2008); Jenny S. Martinez,
The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law (Oxford, 2012); for a
critique, see Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge,
Mass., 2010), ch. 1 and p. 247, n. 46. Robert Conrad’s pioneering article on liberated
Africans in Brazil emphasized both de facto enslavement and a ‘legal purgatory
between slavery and freedom’: Robert Conrad, ‘Neither Slave nor Free: The
Emancipados of Brazil, 1818–1868’, The Hispanic American Historical Review, liii
(1973), 51, 69; see also Luis Carlos Soares, ‘Urban Slavery in Nineteenth Century
Rio de Janeiro’ (Univ. of London Ph.D. thesis, 1988), 427, for the view that liberated
Africans lived in ‘total slavery’.
12 Useful examples include Alejandro de la Fuente, ‘Slave Law and Claims-Making
in Cuba: The Tannenbaum Debate Revisited’, Law and History Review, xxii (2004);
Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery (Cambridge,
Mass., 2005); Natalie Zemon Davis, ‘Judges, Masters, Diviners: Slaves’ Experience of
Criminal Justice in Colonial Suriname’, Law and History Review, xxix (2011); Camillia
Cowling, Conceiving Freedom: Women of Color, Gender, and the Abolition of Slavery in
Havana and Rio de Janeiro (Chapel Hill, NC, 2013); Michelle A. McKinley, Fractional
Freedoms: Slavery, Intimacy, and Legal Mobilization in Colonial Lima, 1600–1700 (New
York, 2016).
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Africans, but also gave liberated Africans the chance to reshape
the law to suit the particular claims they wished to make. Instead
of a position on a spectrum between enslavement and the ‘full
freedom’ associated with rights, ‘liberated African’ legal status
was characterized by what I call unguaranteed entitlements.
Liberated Africans could plausibly claim certain kinds of
treatment, wages and status, as prescribed by anti-slave-trade
treaties, but they possessed no right to those goods. Liberated
Africans could claim something from the state, but the state
was only ever obligated to honour that claim as part of adhering
to abolitionism as a projected moral universal, rather than in
terms of respecting rights or for fear of any formal
international, superstate legal sanction.
I
In Lauren Benton’s influential analysis, the polities on the shores
of the early modern Atlantic resembled a series of ‘jurisdictional
polygons’ mapped onto land. Instead of seeing empires as
projecting spheres of influence or meeting at borderlands,
Benton describes states as trying to fill up spaces with
sovereignty. Sovereignty may be strong or weak at specific
points at the edges of these spaces.13 A state tried to exploit its
rivals’ weaknesses, leading to areas such as enclaves or riverine
regions, which competing states struggled to occupy and manage
completely. No single state could possess the sea, so individual
ships travelled across the Atlantic as sovereign ‘corridors’, bearing
the sovereignty of the state under whose flag the ship sailed.
Benton’s model helps to visualize how Britain intended the
suppression of the slave trade to work. Britain tried to reshape
the polygons, points and corridors of sovereignty in the Atlantic
world from 1807 onwards. Until the end of the Napoleonic Wars
in 1815, Britain’s metropolitan government authorized the Royal
Navy to intercept suspected slave ships as wartime enemies, and
intercepted ships became the prizes of the naval captors.14
Suppression was essentially a question of British naval corridors
13 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires,
1400–1900 (New York, 2010).
14 Bethell, ‘Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave
Trade’, 81; Benton, ‘Abolition and Imperial Law’; Scanlan, ‘Rewards of Their
Exertions’, 138–9.
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attacking enemy naval corridors. But from 1815 onwards,
Britain’s former allies and enemies demanded that the anti-
slave-trade patrols and courts operate according to a set of
internationally-agreed principles, and so Britain signed a series
of bilateral treaties with Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands.
The treaties incrementally generalized the category of ‘liberated
African’ until it covered most slave-trading routes — for example,
the treaty with Brazil, signed after independence, was almost a
copy of the one with Portugal. These bilateral treaties established
a new set of jurisdictional points at port cities around the Atlantic,
which hosted the mixed-commission and vice-admiralty courts,
and which thereby became the key sites for the adjudication of
slave ships and the conversion of slaves into liberated Africans.
From a war between corridors, abolition in its second phase
became a question of how effective a set of international
jurisdictional points would be at processing slave ships.
The treaties did not cover all slave-trading routes. France and
the United States resisted signing treaties — France insisted that
its national courts have jurisdiction over its intercepted slave
ships, and the United States did not agree to a mutual right of
search of its ships with Britain until the Civil War. But the most
serious problem was the Brazilian slave trade. The initial treaty
with Portugal only targeted the slave trade north of the equator,
but just three ports (Luanda, Cabinda and Benguela) accounted
for the majorityof the Lusophone slave trade in the early nineteenth
century, and all of them were south of the equator.15 Ironically, the
slave trade to Brazil expanded after abolition. Of the entire
transatlantic slave trade, the destination with the single largest
number of embarked slaves was Brazil in the decade 1821–30,
with around 553,000 embarkations. Brazil’s imperial government
was reluctant to suppress the slave trade, even mocking the Feijo´
Law that declared it illegal in 1831 as ‘para ingles ver’ (‘[merely]
for the English to see’).16 By sheer volume of slaves and by
intransigence to diplomatic pressure, the South Atlantic trade
15 See, for instance, the ports of embarkation between 1800 and the declaration of
Brazilian independence in 1822: Estimates Database (2016), Voyages: The Trans-
Atlantic Slave Trade Database (hereafter TSTD), at5http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/
F1L0U1VU4(accessed 9 Dec. 2017).
16 Courtney J. Campbell, ‘Making Abolition Brazilian: British Law and Brazilian
Abolitionists in Nineteenth-Century Minas Gerais and Pernambuco’, Slavery and
Abolition, xxxvi (2015), 522, 523.
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to Brazil occupied top place in Britain’s anti-slave-trade agendum
from 1826 until the closing of the trade in 1851.
After another decade of heavy slave trading, and with diplomatic
murmurings that Portugal and Brazil were having second thoughts
about renewing the anti-slave-trade treaties, the British
government decided that unilateral action would fill the legal
gaps in the international regime. The Palmerston Act 1839 (2 &
3 Vict., c. 73) and Aberdeen Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict., c. 122)
authorized the Navy to intercept any suspected slaver bound for
Portugal and Brazil whether it was carrying slaves or merely fitted
out for the trade, and whether it displayed a clear nationality or
not.17 British squadrons could now reach beyond the treaties,
which had limited interceptions to ships whose flags
corresponded to the treaties’ signatories, to consider any potential
slave vessel. Slavers without a clear nationality fell under the
jurisdiction of vice-admiralty courts, and so port cities began to
witness an increase in the numberof vice-admiralty cases alongside
mixed-commission ones.
The period 1839–52 was therefore a periodof rapidexpansion of
British domination in and around the Atlantic to suppress the slave
trade, and the primary target of that expansion was Brazil. At the
same time, the period represented a pivot within the British
imperial imagination regarding liberated Africans for two
reasons. First, the Palmerston Act crushed the slave trade from
south-east Africa to the Atlantic, and the Cape Town courts
adjudicated most of the intercepted slave ships. In 1842,
Portugal agreed a new anti-slave-trade treaty with Britain and,
over the next two years, naval squadrons effectively eliminated
the trade. Second, from 1839, colonial governors at Sierra
Leone implemented a policy of retrenchment. To cut the
administrative costs of settling newly-arrived liberated Africans,
the colony periodically exported thousands of them to the
Caribbean.18 Although the Cape sits geographically and
conceptually in the histories of both the Atlantic and Indian
17 The Palmerston Act initially authorized only the capture of Portuguese south of
the equator and fitted-out slave ships, but three weeks after its passage, naval officers
were instructed to intercept indeterminate ships too. Leslie Bethell, Abolition of the
Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807–1869
(Cambridge, 1970), 161–4; Huzzey, ‘Politics of Slave-Trade Suppression’.
18 Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone (London, 1962), 219; Rosanne
Marion Adderley, ‘‘New Negroes from Africa’’: Slave Trade Abolition and Free African
Settlement in the Nineteenth-Century Caribbean (Bloomington, 2006).
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Oceans, the anti-slave-trade activity that ultimately closed the
major routes in the South Atlantic made the Cape more part of
the Atlantic in the years 1839–52.19 Within a legal category that
stretched over the entire Atlantic, these years represented a period
when the questions of liberated Africans’ arrival, settlement and
legal status impinged most on Brazil and the Cape. Port cities
were points at the edge of jurisdictional polygons, and from 1839
Cape Town was a particularly important point for the management
of incoming liberated Africans.
The port cities of Salvador da Bahia and Cape Town offer a
fruitful comparison of the effects of anti-slave-trade law in the
years following the Palmerston Act, as state officials and
liberated Africans attempted to make sense of how to interpret
the many laws and processes that defined the legal status of
liberated Africans. Both port cities were volatile prior to 1839
and fundamentally unprepared for the influx of liberated
Africans that the state authorities would be required to manage.
Subaltern groups, such as mobile labouring bands of ex-slaves,
presented urgent problems to political authority.
In 1839, the Cape had been a British colony for only thirty-
three years (excluding the brief British occupation in the period
1795–1803), and its continued colonial rule was by no means
certain. There were six frontier wars between the British and
the Xhosa, or another polity, between 1799 and 1852. The
Boers had headed north in the ‘Great Trek’ in 1834 partly to
escape British colonial jurisdiction that had recognized the
emancipation and landowning rights of Khoikhoi and
‘coloured’ populations under Ordinance 50 (1828).20 Within
the Western Cape, the press tried to preserve a self-image of
stability and respectability.21 But the region was still vulnerable
to the same pressures of slave resistance that troubled many
19 On Cape Town’s history, see Nigel Worden (ed.), Cape Town between East and
West: Social Identities in a Dutch Colonial Town (Auckland Park, South Africa, 2012).
20 Susan Newton-King, ‘The Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 1807–28’, in
Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial
South Africa (London and New York, 1980); Stanley Trapido, ‘ ‘‘The Friends of the
Natives’’: Merchants, Peasants and the Political and Ideological Structure of
Liberalism in the Cape, 1854–1910’, in Marks and Atmore (eds.), Economy and
Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa; Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures:
Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900 (Cambridge, 2002).
21 Kirsten McKenzie, Scandal in the Colonies: Sydney and Cape Town, 1820–1850
(Carlton, 2004).
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places around the Atlantic. In 1825, Galant, a slave in Bokkeveld
(around 100 miles north of Cape Town), led a rebellion, killing
his owner and two others.22 A slave maroon community existed
on the outskirts of Cape Town in the eighteenth century.23 The
Protector of Slaves, established in 1826 to help improve slaves’
living and working conditions, allowed slaves to submit
complaints against masters in cases of corporal punishment,
constraints on behaviour (such as refusals to allow slaves to
marry) and denials of manumission.24
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE FROM
SOUTH EAST AFRICA*
* Source: Slave trade from figures from Estimates Database (2016), TSTD, at5http://
slavevoyages.org/voyages/v9tMFb7C4(accessed 9 Dec. 2017). Court captures
derived from adding data from CCT 382, Collector of Customs Registration Book,
‘Negroes 24 Oct ’43 to 23 May ’51’, Western Cape Archives, Cape Town, South Africa
(hereafter WCA), and Mixed Commission Minutes of Proceedings 1843–1859, FO
312/24, UKNA. Note that CCT 382 is the only extant register of perhaps three in
total, and the data from at least seventeen ships is missing. Correspondence with British
Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope, Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd
Islands; Reports from British Vice-Admiralty Courts and Naval Officers on Slave Trade,
1849–50 (Class A), Parliamentary Papers, 1850, lv, paper 1290.
22 G. M. Theal (ed.), Records of the Cape Colony (London, 1904), vol. xx, 188–341.
23 R. L. Watson, The Slave Question: Liberty and Property in South Africa
(Middletown, Conn., 1990), 50–1.
24 McKenzie, Scandal in the Colonies, ch. 5; Fiona Vernal, ‘ ‘‘No Such Thing as a
Mulatto Slave’’: Legal Pluralism, Racial Descent and the Nuances of Slave Women’s
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Capetonian political authorities developed similar institutions to
manage liberated Africans, mainly in response to metropolitan
pressure and Africans’ complaints. In 1828, the Bigge-Colebrooke
Commission of Inquiry uncovered widespread corruption regarding
the allocation of liberated Africans to private hirers and how they
were treated during apprenticeship.25 Charles Blair and the
wonderfully named William Wilberforce Bird had conspired to use
their Treasury positions to assign liberated African apprentices to
preferred clients as part of business deals.26 During this process, the
liberated African cook Jean Elle´ suffered de facto re-enslavement
when Blair transferred him from a benevolent hirer to an
unpleasant one.27 Elle´’s testimony to the Commission was crucial
in prompting the Inquiry to criticize Blair and Bird. The
Commissioners’ proposed remedy was the introduction of a ten-
shilling servant tax to protect the interests of apprentices against
exploitative masters.28
Like Cape Town, Salvador had periodically faced slave
resistance in the early nineteenth century, such as the tailor
revolt in 1798, the fishermen revolt of 1814, and fears that
Candomble´ practices inside ‘African tenements’ in the city
(n. 24 cont.)
Sexual Vulnerability in the Legal Odyssey of Steyntje van de Kaap, c.1815–1822’,
Slavery and Abolition, xxix (2008), 41.
25 Christopher Saunders, ‘ ‘‘Free, yet Slaves’’: Prize Negroes at the Cape Revisited’,
in Nigel Worden and Clifton Crais (eds.), Breaking the Chains: Slavery and Its Legacy in
the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony (Johannesburg, 1994); McKenzie, Imperial
Underworld, ch. 4. On the Commission of Inquiry, which investigated colonial
governance in the Cape, Mauritius and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), see Zoe¨ Laidlaw,
‘Investigating Empire: Humanitarians, Reform and the Commission of Eastern
Inquiry’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, xl (2012).
26 John Philip, Researches in South Africa Illustrating the Civil, Moral, and Religious
Condition of the Native Tribes: Including Journals of the Author’s Travels in the Interior,
Together with Detailed Accounts of the Progress of the Christian Missions, Exhibiting the
Influence of Christianity in Promoting Civilization (London, 1828), vol. i, 388–91.
27 Saunders, ‘ ‘‘Free, yet Slaves’’ ’; Patrick Harries, ‘ ‘‘Ideas of Liberty and
Freedom’’: Servile Labour at the Cape Colony Before and After Emancipation’, in
Babacar Fall, Ineke Phaf and Andreas Eckert (eds.), Travail et culture dans un monde
globalise´: de l’Afrique a` l’Ame´rique Latine (Paris, 2015), 181; McKenzie, Imperial
Underworld, ch. 4.
28 There was no punishment for Blair and Bird, however, because the Commission
had powers to investigate but not to punish, and Blair and Bird had also kept their
arrangements informal to reduce the chance of finding legal proof of corruption. See
McKenzie, Imperial Underworld, 128.
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could form an urban maroon community.29 The most severe
revolt was the Maleˆ rebellion in January 1835, when hundreds
of slaves, led by African-born Muslims, had marched through the
streets. In response, the chief of police suggested two new ways of
dealing with freed slaves (libertos), particularly those born in
Africa and who had gained manumission in Brazil. In a letter to
the Ministry of Justice in Rio de Janeiro, he argued that African-
born libertos were a threat to ‘our political existence’ and that the
Ministry should therefore authorize either mass deportations or
compulsory labour on plantations, rather than allowing the
libertos to roam Salvador where it was difficult to track them.30
The provincial assembly of Bahia added three more policies in a
proposal to the General Legislative Assembly. First, the assembly
wished to strike an agreement with the Republic of Uruguay and
the Provinces of Rio da Prata to prevent the continuation of the
illegal slave trade ‘of millions of barbarians, which, with the most
shameful scandal, still occurs in our ports’, and which was even
more threatening to Bahia’s security and prosperity than ‘the
spirit of insurrection and rebellion’ that arose during the period
of the legitimate slave trade. Second, ‘the absolute cessation of all
Commerce between our ports and those of west and east Africa,
with the exception of the Cape Colony’ would prevent the revival
of any slave trading. Third, a Brazilian colony in Africa would
offer a new home for libertos where ‘the Laws of humanity, the
precepts of the Christian Religion, and the principles of current
civilization’ would guide colonial rule.31 In effect, the provincial
assembly advocated the retraction of the jurisdictional corridors
of goods and slaves that had paradoxically led Bahia to grow rich
and become chronically unstable.
By the 1850s, the police and Ministry of Justice had begun to
apply this dual approach to liberated Africans whom naval patrols
29 On rebellions and conspiracies, see George Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin America,
1800–2000 (Oxford, 2004), 75; Greg L. Childs, ‘Secret and Spectral: Torture and
Secrecy in the Archives of Slave Conspiracies’, Social Text, xxxiii (2015). On urban
‘quilombos’ (maroon groups) in tenement housing, see Joa˜o Jose´ Reis, Divining
Slavery and Freedom: The Story of Domingos Sodre´, an African Priest in Nineteenth-
Century Brazil, trans. H. Sabrina Gledhill (New York, 2015), 166.
30 Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, Negros, estrangeiros: os escravos libertos e sua volta a`
Africa (Sa˜o Paulo, 1985), 75.
31 ‘Representac¸a˜o da Assemble´a [sic] Provincial da Bahia a` Assemble´a [sic] Geral
Legislativa’, 11 May 1835, enclosed in George Jackson to Palmerston, despatch 33,
FO 84/175, UKNA.
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had rescued from slave ships (africanos livres). In annual reports,
the Ministry periodically announced its intentions to deport
liberated Africans.32 Cape Town and Salvador were port cities
that had chronic problems with the breakdown of legal order
related to former slaves. For anti-slave-trade policies to be
effective, Foreign and Colonial Office personnel in London had
assumed that the jurisdictional points would be the strongest
parts of the system, with courts and accountable officials for
managing liberated Africans. But the points were arguably the
weakest places because it was so hard to keep track of mobile
labouring populations, unlike on plantations.
Cape Town was one of the largest sites of settlement in the years
1839–52, with at least 3,505 liberated Africans rescued through
the vice-admiralty court and an uncertain number transferred
from St Helena to work in domestic service.33 Salvador, by
contrast, accommodated only a few hundred liberated Africans
during the nineteenth century.34 The demographics of arrival
were similar in both places: mortality between embarkation on
a slave ship and the end of quarantine for slaves arriving at Bahia
and liberated Africans arriving at Cape Town were respectively
15.6 per cent and 16.8 per cent.35 While Cape Town had vice-
32 Conrad, ‘Neither Slave nor Free’.
33 An exact figure is hard to calculate. 3,505 is a lower threshold, derived from
Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope,
Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands, 221–5; Robert Shell has argued that there
were at least five thousand liberated Africans brought to the Cape in the period 1808–
56, excluding any reproduction: Robert Carl-Heinz Shell, Children of Bondage: A
Social History of the Slave Society at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652–1838 (Hanover,
NH, 1994), 148; Chris Saunders mentions that 1,360 St Helenan liberated
Africans were brought to the Cape: Christopher Saunders, ‘Between Slavery and
Freedom: The Importation of Prize Negroes to the Cape in the Aftermath of
Emancipation’, Kronos, ix (1984), 39. Patrick Harries has suggested seven thousand
for the period c.1840–70 (private communication, 9 Mar. 2016).
34 Governo da Provı´ncia, Tesouraria, correspondeˆncia recebida do Inspetor da
Tesouraria da Bahia 1857, Mac¸o 4247, Arquivos Pu´blicos do Estado da Bahia,
Salvador, Brazil (hereafter APEB). On liberated Africans in Brazil more generally,
see Afonso Bandeira Florence, ‘Entre o cativeiro e a emancipac¸a˜o: a liberdade dos
africanos livres no Brasil (1818–1864)’ (Federal Univ. of Bahia Mestrado dissertation,
2002).
35 For the mortality of the slave trade to Bahia in the years 1838–47, see Estimates
Database (2016), TSTD, at5http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/UWTnazzr4(accessed
28 Feb. 2017) (11.1 per cent) and Alexandre Vieira Ribeiro’s calculation of 5 per cent
rate of slaves after arrival: Alexandre Vieira Ribeiro, ‘The Transatlantic Slave Trade to
Bahia, 1582–1851’, in David Eltis and David Richardson (eds.), Extending the
Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (New Haven and
London, 2008), 148. This gives a combined survival statistic of 0.8445 (0.889 x
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admiralty and mixed-commission courts to process prize slave
arrivals, Salvador had no analogous judicial structure (since the
British–Brazilian Courts of Mixed Commission were in Rio de
Janeiro and Freetown). The liberated Africans in Salvador
probably ended up there from interceptions along the Brazilian
coast during which naval officers decided that the prize negroes
were too ill to transport to Rio de Janeiro and therefore landed
their recaptives at the nearest port instead. As the jurisdictional
points came under the strain of adjudication, fissures opened up
in which liberated Africans’ claims-making became most potent
and visible.36
II
As well as internal reasons within each port city that made state
authorities in Salvador and Cape Town unprepared for dealing
with the influx of liberated Africans, there were external reasons,
primarily the difficulties that the Royal Navy faced in
identifying liberated Africans. State officials tried to convert an
ambiguous population into a manageable workforce through
obsessive documentation at every step of legal transformation:
identification and capture of slave ships, adjudication at
port, registration and apprenticeship. By interpreting and
implementing anti-slave-trade laws, state officials left an
archival trail of the conventions and challenges during that
conversion process along the Bahian and Cape coasts. The
ultimate aim of this process was to transform a slave, who was
outside relations of interdependency and subject to arbitrary
coercion, to being a liberated African, who worked for a
(n. 35 cont.)
0.95), or a mortality of 15.55 per cent. For Cape Town, I have used the death records
cited in Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope,
Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands and added in deaths recorded by the Collector
of Customs for the prize negroes during their quarantine and registration, for which
see CCT 382, WCA.
36 Useful analyses of how states manage populations in port cities include Richard
H. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins
of Environmentalism, 1600–1860 (Cambridge and New York, 1995); Janet J. Ewald,
‘Crossers of the Sea: Slaves, Freedmen, and Other Migrants in the Northwestern
Indian Ocean, c.1750–1914’, American Historical Review, cv (2000); Henk
Driessen, ‘Mediterranean Port Cities: Cosmopolitanism Reconsidered’, History and
Anthropology, xvi (2005).
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hirer and was subject to the oversight of specially-designated
state officials.
At 2 a.m. on 9 December 1839, the crew of HMS Modeste had
observed a suspicious sail south-south-east of its position
approximately 90 nautical miles south of Quelimane. The
Modeste gave chase for nearly three hours south-south-west,
nearly hitting a reef. The wind dropped a knot, and perhaps the
suspected slaver spotted an opportunity to outrun its hunter: it
shot at the Modeste and then threw ‘boats, casks, etc.’ overboard in
the hope of making a getaway. It took the Modeste almost nine
hours to force the Portuguese brig to yield. The Escorpia˜o was now
36 hours from Quelimane, and was a large prize: 756 slaves.37
Slaves were of course the most obvious evidence of slave
trading, and traders wielded political and diplomatic as well as
maritime resistance to capture. On 22 July 1851, the steamer
HMS Sharpshooter observed a brig south-east of Cabo Frio on
the Brazilian coast. It caught the Piratinim after over two hours of
pursuit. It took the Sharpshooter’s officers five minutes to decide to
detain the ship, having found ‘90 negroes in the hold’, matting for
slaves, and ‘a division separating the women from the men’.38
It did not matter that the provincial government of Bahia had
authorized the Piratinim to carry these slaves to Rio, nor that
representatives in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies gave
speeches condemning the Sharpshooter’s interference. The Navy
confiscated the slaves and transferred them to HMS Crescent, a
British ship at Rio de Janeiro that held slaves captured in Brazilian
waters. The Crescent released these slaves as liberated Africans in
either Rio de Janeiro or the British colonies in the Caribbean.39
As the Sharpshooter’s log reveals, naval squadrons looked
beyond embarked slaves for evidence of slave trading,
investigating the ship’s construction, layout and cargo, such as
the spare plank required for laying a slave deck, shackles and large
37 Entry for 9 Dec. 1839, ship log of HMS Modeste, ADM 53/837, UKNA.
38 Entry for 22 July 1851, ship log of HMS Sharpshooter, ADM 53/3534, UKNA.
39 For the Piratinim, see Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, 355–7; for the
operations of the Crescent, see Adderley, ‘‘New Negroes from Africa’’, 246 (appendix
2); Beatriz G. Mamigonian, ‘In the Name of Freedom: Slave Trade Abolition, the Law
and the Brazilian Branch of the African Emigration Scheme (Brazil–British West
Indies, 1830s–1850s)’, Slavery and Abolition, xxx (2009), 47 (table 2), 53.
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quantities of rice and water.40 Although the bilateral treaties and
parliamentary Instructions to Naval Officers (1844) attempted to
stipulate what made a ship ‘fitted out’ for the trade, these
legislative frameworks could not prevent officers’ creative
interpretations. In the case of the Unia˜o, the officers of the
Helena had their suspicions aroused by the hatchway, which
seemed larger than usual for a merchant vessel, and the ledgers
(horizontal beams that supported the hold), which seemed to
have been bunched together to make room for human cargo.41
But the 1844 Instructions did not mention that bunched ledgers or
large hatchways were grounds for detention, only hatches that
were fitted with open gratings.
Even the definition of a slave could provoke similar confusion.
The Treaty of 1842 permitted Portuguese settlers who were
returning from Africa to Portugal to travel with slaves who were
‘bona fide household servants’, as long as these Africans travelled
with ‘passports’ and not on slave ships.42 But passports had no
standardized content or authority and naval crews struggled to
differentiate between enslavement, domestic servitude, any kind
of bonded labour, and willing ‘free’ labour regarding the work of
African marines (the legal term for anybody employed on a ship)
on board suspicious vessels.43
Just as the rules for identifying slave ships and slaves were open
to interpretation, so too were the rules regarding the treatment of
prize negroes between the detention of the slave ship and its
arrival in a port for adjudication. Prize negroes were, for
instance, subject to being transferred to a different squadron
ship, as the crew of the Unia˜o had been. In 1841, HMS Acorn
intercepted the Anna, which was carrying six hundred slaves,
probably to Salvador.44 Eighty died soon after detention.
40 See, for example, Palmerston Act, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 73, ‘Act for the Suppression of
the Slave Trade’ (1839), article iv.
41 See the corroborating statement of James Brown, Master of HMS Winchester,
item 38, FO 312/37, UKNA.
42 Article V, Instructions for the Guidance of Her Majesty’s Naval Officers Employed in
the Suppression of the Slave Trade, Parliamentary Papers, 1844, l, papers 577, 489. The
1844 Instructions were the only general, codified set of guidelines for the Navy in the
period 1839–52.
43 For additional examples, see Burroughs, ‘Eyes on the Prize’, 110, on the Maria de
Gloria; Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins
of International Law, 1800–1850 (Cambridge, Mass., 2016), 128.
44 TSTD lists this ship, spelt Ana (ID 3140), with Rio de Janeiro as the principal
place of slave disembarkation because the ship was intercepted and the slaves
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British authorities at Rio arranged the transfer of 470 to the
Crescent, 150 of whom then passed to the Arrow, which must
have re-crossed the Atlantic.45 The Collector of Customs at
Cape Town eventually registered 148 of them. Two years later,
British vessels intercepted the Vencedora and an unknown vessel
chartered for Brazil. Again, authorities transferred 895 slaves in
total to the Crescent, declared the Vencedora unseaworthy, but
registered it as a prize at the vice-admiralty court at Cape
Town.46 Within a convoluted process of slave transfers and
judicial decisions, British jurisdiction over the condemnation of
vessels and apprenticeship of liberated Africans stretched from
Cape Town to the ports of Rio and Salvador.
Squadrons improvised depending on the conditions in which
they found the slaves and on naval crews’ fears about slaves’
behaviour between detention and adjudication. After a five-
hour chase on the morning of 13 December 1844, HMS
Cleopatra ran aground an anonymous brig on the banks of Rio
Mariangombe near Quelimane. The crew had abandoned the
slave ship with approximately 420 slaves imprisoned in the hold
behind a fastened grating. The boarding officer, who wrote an
unsigned statement in the ship’s log, claimed that he decided
with the Captain, Charles Wyvill, and Lieutenant that ‘the only
chance of saving [the slaves’] lives was to allow them to swim on
shore’. They transferred seven slaves to the Cleopatra, five of
whom survived for emancipation by the vice-admiralty court at
Cape Town.47
Shortly before capturing the elusive Escorpia˜o, HMS Modeste
had captured the Anna Feliz. Two days after the capture, the
officers decided to supply the squadronal crew who were sailing
the prize with several weapons, including twelve light cannon and
(n. 44 cont.)
transferred to the Crescent. But the ship was caught at 15.288South 20.308West which
suggests a route to Salvador.
45 Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope,
Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands, 222.
46 For the most accurate number of liberated Africans who boarded the Crescent,
see the ship log of HMS Crescent, ADM 53/2349, UKNA; Correspondence with British
Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope, Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd
Islands, enclosure 153.
47 Entry for 13 Dec. 1844, ship log of HMS Cleopatra, ADM 53/2195, UKNA;
CCT 382, WCA; Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of
Good Hope, Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands.
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several hundred cartridges for pistols and muskets, probably to
keep the prize negroes under control.48 It is impossible to know
exactly what the crew feared might happen; the fact that the
average time between capture and sentencing was often longer
than the Middle Passage probably increased the chances of
expressions of anguish, frustration or rebellion by prize
negroes.49 Perhaps the prize negroes were complaining about
their cramped and infectious living arrangements below deck,
fearful of dying from smallpox.50
After arrival, state officials in the port classified the prize negroes
as healthy, waged employees. In this context, it is useful to think
about a set of terms from the historical literature on slavery in
Africa. Referring to a debate between scholars about how
harshly owners treated their slaves in Africa, Martin Klein has
pointed out that both sides ‘see slavery within a range of coerced
relationships, both stress a process of incorporation [into kinship
lineages] and both see the slave essentially as an outsider’.51 The
emphasis on the processes by which an outsider becomes an
insider is useful for understanding what happened to a liberated
African upon arrival. Igor Kopytoff has labelled one aspect of that
process ‘terminal commoditization’, by which a commodity is
exchanged and then has its use-function fixed. Prior to terminal
commoditization, a slave’s value veers between processes of
commoditization and individualization, and his or her price is
48 Entry for 28 Nov. 1839, ship log of HMS Modeste, ADM 53/837, UKNA.
49 Of twenty-three interceptions that involved the rescue of slaves and for which the
Cape Town vice-admiralty court adjudicated, the median time between detention and
sentencing was eighty-one days, and the mean was eighty-five days. This was longer
than the Middle Passage from south east Africa to the Americas, which took an average
of 68.4 days. See Estimates Database (2016), TSTD, at5http://slavevoyages.org/
voyages/RktKHMUA4 (accessed 9 Dec. 2017). Averages for Cape Town derived
from Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope,
Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands.
50 See the proclamation about smallpox related to the arrival of these ships in:
Colonial Office, Cape of Good Hope Colony Original Correspondence, CO 48/
207, UKNA, despatch 7. See also the coverage in the South African Commercial
Advertiser, 11 Jan. 1840. For a discussion of relations between prize negroes and
naval crews, see Burroughs, ‘Eyes on the Prize’.
51 Klein’s emphasis on the slave as outsider is derived from M. I. Finley. For the
quotation, see Martin A. Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa (New
York, 1998), 9; key texts in the debate include Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers,
‘Introduction: African ‘‘Slavery’’ as an Institution of Marginality’, in Suzanne Miers
and Igor Kopytoff (eds.), Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives
(Madison, 1977); Claude Meillassoux, Anthropologie de l’esclavage: le ventre de fer et
d’argent (Paris, 1986) especially 12–15.
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unambiguous only at the point of sale.52 The path of a liberated
African from slave ship to adjudication indicates that just as
commoditization as chattel was a process, so was
commoditization as an emancipated, free labourer.53
The key technology for terminal commoditization was the
register of liberated Africans, written soon after the suspected
slave ship entered the port.54 An official in the local treasury
department, such as the Collector of Customs, recorded
liberated Africans’ names, ages and distinguishing marks or
features. The Collector of Customs at Cape Town, William
Field, could use these data to try to identify any liberated
African who fled from the holding facility at Papendorp (a
suburb of Cape Town), and to adjudicate in potential disputes
between hirers over the ownership of a particular apprenticeship
contract. For example, at Cape Town, Jusay was registered on 29
October 1843 as liberated African number twenty-nine from the
unknown brig captured in August by HMS Arrow. He was male,
22 years old, 5 feet 2.5 inches tall, had a ‘large wart under left Ear’
and was ‘Tattooed over right Breast’.55 Particular liberated
Africans may have been appointed to act as interpreters to help
communicate this information.56 The register became invested
with the authority to value and assign liberated Africans
according to their physiological characteristics; it standardized
each liberated African as a member of the labour force.
The treasury officials then transported the liberated Africans to
a quarantine station. In Cape Town, smallpox quarantine
hospitals were established at Wynberg and near the Cape Town
Market.57 The station was one location, along with the ‘Liberated
52 Igor Kopytoff, ‘The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as
Process’, in Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural
Perspective (Cambridge, 1986).
53 Kopytoff, ‘The Cultural Biography of Things’. On the question of how to
conceptualize the slave as historical actor, see Walter Johnson, ‘On Agency’, Journal
of Social History, xxxvii (2003); Joseph C. Miller, The Problem of Slavery as History: A
Global Approach (New Haven, 2012); Nicholas T. Rinehart, ‘The Man That Was a
Thing: Reconsidering Human Commodification in Slavery’, Journal of Social History, l
(2016), for a Kopytoffian argument about the commoditization of slaves.
54 Jennifer Nelson, ‘Apprentices of Freedom: Atlantic Histories of the africanos
livres in Mid-Nineteenth Century Rio de Janeiro’, Itinerario, xxxix (2015); Henry B.
Lovejoy, ‘The Registers of Liberated Africans of the Havana Slave Trade Commission:
Implementation and Policy, 1824–1841’, Slavery and Abolition, xxxvii (2016).
55 CCT 382, WCA.
56 See the discussion of interpreters in Lovejoy, ‘Registers of Liberated Africans of
the Havana Slave Trade Commission’.
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African Yard’, where state officials began making plans for the
apprenticeship of liberated Africans. Quarantine was nothing
new — it was a key component of the ‘seasoning’ of slaves —
but the decision to hold liberated Africans in quarantine
stations led to their working in these institutions due to local,
short-term necessity. For instance, eight liberated Africans
rescued in 1855 ended up working in ‘Mont Serrat’ in
Salvador, the same Catholic sanctuary and hospital that
quarantined slaves who were suffering from smallpox following
the Middle Passage.58 Here slaves and liberated Africans shared
occupational and social connections in a space of state oversight.
Treasury officials then advertised the availability of liberated
African labour to local hirers and other government departments
in publications such as the Government Gazette. Publication
brought the stipulations in bilateral treaties into existence. For
instance, Article VII of the Act for the abolition of the slave trade
1807 (47 Geo. III, c. 36), in force from 1808, authorized state
officials
to bind [liberated Africans] . . . as Apprentices, for any Term not
exceeding Fourteen Years . . . any Indenture of Apprenticeship duly
made and executed . . . shall be of the same Force and Effect as if the
party thereby bound as an Apprentice had himself or herself . . . duly
executed the same; and every such Native of Africa who shall be so
enlisted or entered . . . as a Soldier, Seaman, or Marine, shall
be considered, treated, and dealt with in all Respects as if he had voluntarily
so enlisted or entered himself.59
The definition of a ‘liberated African’ presupposed the legal
capacity to enlist in the forces or to contract to apprenticeship
labour, which common-law precedents never attributed to
chattel slaves.60 The Act attributed to Africans that capacity to
justify decisions made in their interests, and simultaneously
suspended the Africans’ exercise of that personality until after
enlistment or apprenticeship. The subsequent bilateral treaties,
modelled in part on the Abolition Act, did not specify the length
of apprenticeships or the kinds of work liberated Africans would
do, but the regulations for the mixed-commission courts
57 South African Commercial Advertiser, 11 Oct. 1840.
58 Mac¸o 4247, APEB; Ribeiro, ‘Transatlantic Slave Trade to Bahia’, 147.
59 Emphases added.
60 On slaves in English common law, see Miranda Kaufmann, ‘Slavery and
English Common Law’, in Eric Martone (ed.), Encyclopedia of Blacks in European
History and Culture (Westport, Conn., 2008).
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stipulated that every liberated African receive a daily allowance of
1s. (in the Cape) or 180 re´is (in Brazil) for subsistence.61
The treaties framed apprenticeship in terms of political
economy, which posited that an apprentice sold part of her
labour power but not a part of herself in working for another
person under contract. Another relevant conception, which the
treaties did not consider, was ‘wealth-in-people’. An important
strand of scholarship states that a common metaphor among
many Africans portrayed a powerful person who took advantage
of a subordinate as ‘eating’ the subordinate and her wealth, rather
than ‘feeding’ her. Wealth-in-people provided an ethical system
in which apprentices evaluated the fairness or unfairness of
contractual labour relations.62 Unfair treatment by a hirer
could awaken an apprentice’s fear of being eaten through
working for another person.
The publication of information regarding the apprenticeship of
liberated Africans was more prevalent at Cape Town than
Salvador. In the 1840s, the Cape Government Gazette published
details roughly three times a year of how many liberated African
apprentices were available and an order of priority of hirers who
wished to request an apprentice, whereas there was apparently no
similar published material in Salvador.63 Interested parties
requested a specified number of liberated Africans, whose
distribution was recorded in the registers. Hirers signed a
contract, ostensibly with a liberated African but really with the
Collector of Customs, that included Christian instruction,
forbade corporal punishment and, in the 1840s, guaranteed the
payment of a wage, all overseen by the state. The abolition treaties
and state practice in both Salvador and Cape Town attempted to
impose a standard of waged, proselytized liberated African as
evidence of the creation of ‘civilized’ free labour.64
61 See the Regulations of the Courts of Mixed Commission, article viii, Instructions
for the Guidance of Her Majesty’s Naval Officers Employed in the Suppression of the Slave
Trade, 229.
62 Jane I. Guyer and Samuel M. Eno Belinga, ‘Wealth in People as Wealth in
Knowledge: Accumulation and Composition in Equatorial Africa’, Journal of
African History, xxxvi (1995).
63 However, Brazilian legislation did state that the status of liberated Africans would
be published. See Aviso of 29 Oct. 1834 in Colec¸a˜o das deciso˜es do governo do Impe´rio do
Brasil de 1834 (Rio de Janeiro, 1866), 281.
64 John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, i, Christianity,
Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa (Chicago and London, 1991). See also
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For example, the Department for Public Lighting in Salvador
exclusively selected men to work in street lighting, who were paid
100 re´is per day.65 In Cape Town, Field allocated Jusay (recall his
wart behind the ear and tattooed breast) to Paul Stadler,
corn farmer in Smallepad, Groenekloof (present-day Mamre).
He became a farm servant on 5 December 1843, the same date
that his wife, Heppo, became a servant in Stadler’s household.66
These liberated Africans had married before their enslavement,
or as slaves but before embarkation, or on board the slave ship. It
is unlikely that they would have carried any proof of their marital
status with them on their voyage west.67 The archival traces that
remain are of cases in which liberated Africans tried to persuade
Field that they were married and, if he believed them, to allow
them to work in the same location; there are no archival traces of
how liberated Africans reacted if Field denied their requests.
In Salvador, Field’s counterpart was Antonio Francisco de
Aguiar Cardoso, an official in the Thesouraria da Fazenda. He
was required to monitor the apprenticeships of liberated Africans
to private hirers, and the only extant register, for the period 1851–
2, tracked how much each hirer owed the state for the labour of
liberated Africans. He visited each hirer to verify how many
liberated Africans were in his or her charge; each entry lists the
names of every apprentice and dates for payments.68 Ultimately,
state officials monitored liberated Africans at moments of
quarantine, registration and apprenticeship to ensure that
financial payments were correct rather than to defend the rights
of liberated Africans.
(n. 64 cont.)
Alvara´ com forc¸a de lei of 26 Jan. 1818 in Colec¸a˜o das leis do Brasil de 1818 (Rio de
Janeiro, 1889), 9.
65 See Regulamento of 8 May 1858 in Legislac¸a˜o da Provı´ncia da Bahia sobre o negro:
1835 a 1888 (Salvador, 1996), 189, and also Mac¸o 4247, APEB.
66 CCT 382, WCA. Comparison of the Collector of Customs’ register with the
Government Gazette indicates that parents and children, and sometimes siblings,
were also apprenticed to the same hirer and/or in the same location.
67 The only evidence of which I am aware of marriage between prize negroes which
carried over to their liberated African status is Helen MacQuarrie and Andrew
Pearson, ‘Prize Possessions: Transported Material Culture of the Post-Abolition
Enslaved — New Evidence from St Helena’, Slavery and Abolition, xxxvii (2016),
59. The authors found two skeletons who had marriage beads, but it is unclear
whether the use of such beads was confined to particular places and/or peoples in
Africa.
68 Tesouraria da Provincia, livro de contas correntes com os arrematantes de
sala´rios de africanos livres, 1851–1852, Mac¸o 7007, APEB.
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But state officials’ attentiveness to liberated Africans did not
prevent problems from arising, particularly at the point when the
stipulations in international treaties seeped into a state’s internal
legal system (municipal law). In Cape Town, Field initially
applied metropolitan legislation such as the Order-in-Council
of 16 March 1808 and the Slave Trade Act 1824 (5 Geo. IV, c.
113) to apprentice the liberated Africans from the Anna Feliz and
Escorpia˜o. The legislation, authorizing apprenticeship for up to
seven years, was unsatisfactory because many children would not
have reached maturity after a seven-year-long apprenticeship.
Field reached a temporary solution with the Cape Attorney
General to apprentice the children for seven years with an
addendum that enabled an extension.69 He then wrote to the
Governor, requesting amendments to metropolitan legislation
to enable apprenticeships until males reached eighteen and
females sixteen. In May 1843, Field was still waiting for the
updated Order-in-Council (promised in March 1842) and was
required to request from the Governor permission to continue his
extended apprenticeship scheme on a provisional basis.70
Apprenticeship arrangements posed an even greater problem in
Salvador than in Cape Town. The ownership of slaves was still
legal in Brazil, and there was no civil code for determining
labour relations. The Ordenac¸o˜es Filipinas (in force since 1603)
contained many key clauses that shaped relations between
Africans and their hirers. A prospective owner could refuse to
purchase a slave because of disease or a defect but not because of
a ‘character flaw’.71 The only exception was if the slave revealed a
tendency to flee. This distinguished a slave from an animal (besta),
which an owner could legitimately reject if it was cowardly or
rebellious.72 A slave did not possess legal personality according
to the Ordenac¸o˜es, but there was a relation between a slave’s
inherent traits and the phenomenology of her behaviour in a way
that was not true of an animal; the animal’s behaviour was the
purchasable animal in the eyes of the law. The importance of
69 Collector of Customs Despatches to the Colonial Office, CO 517, Field to
Secretary of Government, 26 Feb. 1840, enclosed in despatch 61, WCA.
70 Ibid.
71 Caˆndido Mendes de Almeida (ed.), Codigo Philippino, ou, Ordenac¸o˜es e leis do reino
de Portugal (Rio de Janeiro, 1870), bk iv, tı´tulo xvii, title and clause 2. This is the first
edition printed in Brazil. I consulted the 1985 facsimile edition, reprinted by
Fundac¸a˜o Calouste Gulbenkian.
72 Mendes de Almeida (ed.), Codigo Philippino, bk iv, tı´tulo xvii, clause 8.
200 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 241
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/241/1/179/5134187 by U
niversity of C
am
bridge user on 16 January 2019
inherent traits informed another set of lawswithin the Ordenac¸o˜es,
which specified punishments for slaves for carrying an arquebus,
arson and flight.73 If anybody provided encouragement, reason or
assistance to a slave to flee, he or she suffered banishment, flogging
or ‘became the captive’ (i.e. slave) of the master.74
The key question in Salvador, then, was how to prevent
liberated Africans, as ‘free labourers’, from encouraging huge
numbers of slaves to seek liberty.75 This prospect was especially
pressing because the state should, in theory, have applied
apprenticeship and post-apprenticeship emancipation to all
Africans who arrived in Brazil after 1831. These slaves were
victims of an illegal trade and Britain or Brazil could have
reclassified all 95,000 of those transported to Bahia as liberated
Africans (africanos livres). Although freed slaves (libertos) had
several routes to manumission in Salvador — such as self-
purchase and bequests in owner’s wills — they relied upon
negotiations with their owners, who in many cases could re-
enslave them at any time by revoking consent for
manumission.76 Libertos’ status as citizens, declared by the
1824 Constitution, was dependent upon and circumscribed by
the maintenance of cordial relations with their owners (and their
owners’ families or executors).77 By contrast, africanos livres were
freed by virtue of a state mandate. There was no extant system in
Salvador, or Brazil, for the accommodation of liberated Africans,
and state authorities feared that liberated Africans would set a
precedent for slaves to gain freedom uninhibited by their
owners’ conditional will for manumission.78 The continual fear
of disruption led authorities to continue apprenticing africanos
73 Mendes de Almeida (ed.), Codigo Philippino, bk v, tı´tulo lxxxvi, clause 5 (arson);
bk v, tı´tulo lxii, clauses 1 and 2 (flight); bk v, tı´tulo lxxx, clause 13 (carrying an
arquebus).
74 Mendes de Almeida (ed.), Codigo Philippino, bk v, tı´tulo lxiii.
75 Sidney Chalhoub, A forc¸a da escravida˜o: ilegalidade e costume no Brasil oitocentista
(Sa˜o Paulo, 2012), ch. 7.
76 Sidney Chalhoub, ‘The Politics of Ambiguity: Conditional Manumission, Labor
Contracts and Slave Emancipation in Brazil (1850s–1888)’, International Review of
Social History, lx (2015).
77 See Artigo 6 for the definition of Brazil-born libertos as citizens, but also Artigo 94
for the exclusion of libertos from voting for federal senators, deputies, and members of
provincial councils.
78 See also Beatriz Gallotti Mamigonian, ‘O direito de ser africano livre’, Direitos e
justic¸as no Brasil: ensaios de histo´ria social (Campinas, 2006); Mariana Armond Dias
Paes, ‘O procedimento de manutenc¸a˜o de liberdade no brasil oitocentista’, Estudos
Histo´ricos (Rio de Janeiro), xxix (2016).
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livres while paying lip service to the idea of deportation into
the 1850s.79
The lack of clarity regarding the legal capacities of liberated
Africans and the accountability of states meant that abuses
occurred. In Cape Town, the South African Commercial Advertiser
inveighed against a New Constantia farmer, Carel Gerhard
Blanckenburg, whose treatment of his juvenile indentured
labourers was so egregious that it was barely ‘above the point at
which it would have been imperative on [the Commissioners] to
cancel their indentures’. Indeed, he had treated his black workers
as ‘chattel’.80 The Advertiser begged Field to make him ineligible for
the allocation of liberated African apprentices. Yet, in 1844, Field
allocated Alexander, Yeffa, Chakalobo, Voolomalembo and
Lokenni to Blanckenburg.81 In Salvador, Jose´ de Barros Reis
employed liberated Africans to win contracts from the state for
managing public sewerage at Rio Camarajipe, thereby increasing
his revenue stream, but not the wages of his apprentices.82 That
said, apprenticeship conditions and the legal status of liberated
Africans probably improved over time. By 1843, apprenticeship
terms had reduced from fourteen years to three years in Cape
Town with apprentices able to complain to magistrates in cases
of ill-treatment under the Master and Servants Ordinances.
Despite threats of deportation, liberated Africans were never
deported from Salvador (or from anywhere else in Brazil) as
punishment, only ever transferred to the Crescent.83
79 On deportation, see Aviso of 29 Oct. 1834, clause 6, in Colec¸a˜o das deciso˜es do
governo do Impe´rio do Brasil de 1834, 280; Cunha, Negros, estrangeiros.
80 South African Commercial Advertiser, 29 Jan. 1840 (original emphasis).
81 Government Gazette, 28 Mar. 1845; Government Gazette, 30 May 1845;
Government Gazette, 22 Oct. 1846.
82 Jose´ de Barros Reis to the President of the Province, 7 July 1857, Mac¸o 4247,
APEB. See also Adriana Santos Santana, ‘Africanos Livres Na Bahia 1831–1864’
(Univ. Federal de Bahia Mestrado dissertation, 2007), 119.
83 In the 1818 Alvara´, ‘seu pre´stimo e bons costumes’: Colec¸a˜o das leis do Brasil de
1818, 9. I have not been able to work out how many apprenticeships were reduced. In
Cape Town, apprenticeship was reduced initially to one year to bring it in line with the
Master and Servants Ordinance of January 1840 (see CO 48/207, despatch 7,
UKNA). By 1843, Field had increased it to three years even though metropolitan
legislation granted a period of up to seven: see CO 517, WCA. See also Harries,
‘ ‘‘Ideas of Liberty and Freedom’’ ’, 191. Some liberated Africans in Rio de Janeiro
had their apprenticeships extended: Beatriz Mamigonian, ‘To Be a Liberated African
in Brazil: Labour and Citizenship in the Nineteenth Century’ (Univ. of Waterloo
Ph.D. thesis, 2002), ch. 5.
202 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 241
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/241/1/179/5134187 by U
niversity of C
am
bridge user on 16 January 2019
The farther that liberated Africans moved from the jurisdiction
of bilateral treaties at sea towards the municipal laws that covered
the land, the more that key differences emerged between liberated
African experiences at Cape Town and Salvador. In Cape Town,
state authorities were concerned primarily with proving to the
abolitionist metropole that liberated Africans were not slaves.
In addition to inspections regarding wage payments and living
conditions, Field could impose a fine of fifty pounds if hirers
failed to present apprentices to him or a resident magistrate on
the agreed end date of the apprenticeship. The Government
Gazette advertised the end of Jusay and Heppo’s (transcribed
‘Hippo’) apprenticeship in a notice placed at the Custom
House on 21 November 1844 and reprinted in the Government
Gazette the following day. The notice listed data relating to age,
hirer, location and magisterial jurisdiction. Even notable worthies
were accountable to the Collector of Customs and magistracy
regarding their treatment of their apprentices. Hamilton Ross, a
member of the Legislative Council, and Sir Andries
Stockenstro¨m, former lieutenant governor of ‘British Kaffraria’,
were subject to inspections.84 By contrast, in Salvador, the state
was primarily concerned with separating liberated Africans from
chattel slaves for fear of setting a precedent that the imperial state
would, either voluntarily or under pressure from Britain,
guarantee the emancipation of all slaves — which is why re-
exportation appeared to be a promising option for so long.
At the same time, state processes were not the fulfilment of a
rights-based legal regime for liberated Africans. For that to be the
case, bilateral treaties and municipal law would have had to
attribute natural or positive rights to liberated Africans
(conventionally in some kind of constitutional or civil code),
recognize that they had the capacity to exercise those rights,
and provide an enforcement mechanism against state officials
and private individuals when those rights were violated. But in
Cape Town and Salvador, and across the Atlantic, rights were
never clearly attributed; capacity was suspended; and
enforcement focused on periodic checks on hirers and detailed
financial arrangements, rather than on upholding rights.
84 On Hamilton Ross, see Cape Town Mail, 10 Feb. 1844. For the expiration of the
apprenticeship contract of Gaiwae, employed by Sir Andries Stockenstro¨m, see
Government Gazette, 24 Feb. 1848.
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III
Even without a clear system of rights, the complex legal status of
liberated Africans enabled them to make claims to authorities to
try to bend that status closer to their aspirations, but without any
guarantee that states would honour those claims. The mixed-
commission court case of the Unia˜o illustrates the opportunity
for making claims. The prize negroes spent almost two weeks in
the holding barracks at Papendorp until adjudication could
begin, giving them time to discuss their situation in Portuguese
and Makua — one slave, Sabino, was fluent in both. The case got
off to a bad start when the Portuguese Arbitrator (the second-
in-command to the judge), Alfredo Duprat, excused himself from
the deliberations because the ship’s cargo belonged to a relative.85
The Portuguese judge, Lourenc¸o Jose´ Moniz, would adjudicate
with the British judge, George Frere, and in the event of deadlock,
the British Arbitrator would have the final say, invariably
following his superior’s opinion.
It is hard to know how much the judges or the prize negroes
knew about the history of slave migration from Mozambique
Island to the Cape, which Patrick Harries has thoroughly
studied. During a boom in 1797–1807, Portuguese traders
restocked ships and sold sick slaves on the way to Brazil,
resulting in around seven thousand slaves staying in the Cape.
In 1807, Alexander Tennant, a creditor to slave traders, had
secured a permit from the colonial government to import five
hundred slaves to mitigate the Cape’s labour shortage. When
the government discovered that Tennant had imported an
additional 117 slaves, they allowed him to apprentice them.
When Tennant died, the government could no longer hold him
accountable for their well-being and many disappeared, and may
have been re-enslaved.86 The case resulted in an embarrassing
(cont. on p. 205)
85 For Duprat, see 20 Sept. 1844, FO 312/24, UKNA. It is hard to know who the
relative was. There were eight documents, signed by officials in Mozambique, to
authorize Silveira to carry cargo, on board the Unia˜o at the time of capture. Two
refer to Jose d’Andrade Taborda as the recipient (for coffee and ivory); the rest of
the documents do not list a recipient. Silveira listed D’Andrade as the owner of cargo in
his testimony to the mixed-commission court. See item 13 (for the cargo lists) and item
21 (for testimony), FO 312/37, UKNA. The names do not appear in Jose´ Capela,
Diciona´rio de negreiros em Moc¸ambique 1750–1897 (Porto, 2007).
86 Patrick Harries, ‘Mozambique Island, Cape Town and the Organisation of the
Slave Trade in the South-West Indian Ocean, c.1797–1807’, Journal of Southern
African Studies, xlii (2016); for the history of Mozambican migration to South
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investigation in 1817, and was perhaps part of the memory of
bungled manumission that the judges were keen to prevent and
the slaves keen to avoid. In any case, the judges produced a
thorough investigation of the Unia˜o, leaving an archive of sworn
testimony from the ship’s crew, prize negroes and ‘expert’
witnesses about revealing features of a suspected slave ship,
along with copies of passports, certificates from customs houses
and from the naval captors, and surveys of the ship’s fittings. The
documentation forms part of the records of the Cape Courts of
Mixed Commission in the Foreign Office records of the UK
National Archives. James Macleay, secretary and registrar to
the court, collected and ordered the material and transcribed
witness testimony, and the judges signed the preface to the file.87
The first problem to confront the judges was uncovering what,
precisely, the six alleged slaves had said to the crew of the Helena.
Ricketts had reported that they were in ‘bodily fear’ as ‘slaves’.
William Blackford, master of the Bittern and present on the
Helena during the initial exchange, supported but did not
corroborate this version of events: they had ‘all stated through
the Interpreter that they were on board the Unia˜o against their
will’ and four of them were badly dressed. Peter Pasqual, able
seaman on the Bittern and the translator for the six men (from
Portuguese to English), gave testimony that corresponded more
closely to Blackford’s than Ricketts’s: five of the men had stated to
him, during the search of the Unia˜o, that they were on board
against their will, and had suffered ill-treatment. They then
repeated this claim to Ricketts and the commander of the
Bittern, Edmund Peel, on board the Helena. The exception was
Jose´ Mozambique, who had embarked as a servant to a passenger,
(n. 86 cont.)
Africa in the the Natal sugar industry and Kimberley mineral industry, see Patrick
Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa,
c.1860–1910 (Portsmouth, NH, Johannesburg, London and Witwatersrand, 1994);
Patrick Harries, ‘Slavery, Indenture and Migrant Labour: Maritime Immigration
from Mozambique to the Cape, c.1780–1880’, African Studies, lxxiii (2014).
87 The case file is FO 312/37, UKNA. For the backgrounds of some of the key
personnel on the court, see J. P. van Niekerk, ‘British, Portuguese, and American
Judges in Adderley Street: The International Legal Background to and Some
Judicial Aspects of the Cape Town Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the
Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Part 3)’, Comparative and
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, xxxvii (2004), 405–8.
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Gaspar Camacho, and who, in accordance with the 1842 treaty,
possessed a corroborating passport.88
The status of the alleged slaves before embarkation on the Unia˜o
was also obscure, as was their status between embarkation and
interception. The master of the Unia˜o, Joaquim Maria da
Silveira, claimed that the five were chattel slaves before
embarkation. He had bought them and manumitted them on
condition that they would work during the voyage. He certainly
had manumission papers for all five.89 But whether manumission
made any material difference to how he treated the five marines
was questionable: at the end of his testimony, he asked for the
record to be amended to state that he had mistakenly referred to
the five as embarked ‘slaves’, when he had intended to call them
‘negroes’.90 Silveira had bought bilingual Sabino at Quelimane to
replace a marine whom Silveira ominously labelled ‘not
serviceable’. The other four — Joa˜o Cadete, Antonio Valente,
Francisco Serena˜o and Patricio — had joined on 19 July at
Mozambique Island, to replace one black marine who had died
at ‘Nos Beh’ and other crew members who were left at a hospital
due to illness.91 Silveira implied that the five had been treated like
any other crew member because they had been ‘entered on the
Muster Roll’. Camacho testified that the five were ‘free’ when
they came on board. The archival remains of his testimony are
only in English, so whether he used the word liberto or livre is
unrecoverable. ‘None of them showed any Disinclination to go
on board’ and they ‘were satisfied as they were going to get Five
Dollars a Month’.92
Frere and Moniz interviewed the five alleged slaves after they
had questioned Silveira, and before Blackford and Pasqual. They
began proceedings by asking each man for his name and religion,
bringing to the fore signs of truthfulness: could the slaves take a
religious oath? Testimony from all, including the Muslim and
‘Gentile’ slaves, was admissible because they swore that they
88 Item 17, FO 312/37, UKNA.
89 Items 15 and 16, FO 312/37, UKNA.
90 Testimony of Joaquim Maria da Silveira, 26 Sept. 1844, item 21, FO 312/37,
UKNA.
91 The unserviceable and dead black marines might have included Izidoro and Joa˜o
Maria, who were manumitted with Sabino on 19 Dec. 1843, but who were not present
on the ship when it was detained. See register of crew, 31 July 1844 (enclosed in item 1)
and item 15. ‘Nos Beh’ is now Nosy Beh, off northwest Madagascar.
92 Items 21 and 33, 28 Oct. 1844, FO 312/37, UKNA.
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knew what ‘the truth’ was. The judge’s questions focused on the
marines’ labour, clothing and treatment before and during the
voyage, hoping to uncover ‘small clues’ that would provide
clinching proof of enslavement.93 But there was no
straightforward evidentiary relationship between a labour
regime and the socio-legal status of its participants, or rather,
there were as many relationships as there were labour regimes.
Take the fifth and final slave to be interviewed, Francisco
Serena˜o: he was a slave on Mozambique Island, but the captain
freed him on condition that he worked during the Unia˜o’s voyage.
He was flogged when working on board as a ‘sailor’. He had lived a
day-to-day existence on board: ‘He did not know whether he was
to return on shore [when the ship completed its voyage] or to stay
on board’.94 He had no basis for future planning, even on the
small scale open to chattel slaves via provision grounds
entitlements, and none of the social capital that a slave might
have been able to cultivate with other slaves, overseers or
masters on a plantation. Yet, he had suddenly been presented
with the opportunity of some control over the narration of his
past and his choices for the future.
Whether fully intentional or not, the witnesses affected
confusion, even resentment, at the way they had been treated
on board the Unia˜o.95 The witnesses gave different answers to
the question that the judges hoped would resolve the issue
because it was a supposedly distinguishing feature of free
labour. It was one for which they recalled the witnesses: did the
master pay them wages on board? Joa˜o Cadete and Antonio
Valente merely stated that the captain had agreed to pay wages,
but Sabino stated that ‘the Captain said he would pay him Wages,
but he had paid him none’. Serena˜o was even more forceful: ‘The
Captain did not tell him that he was to have any Wages: he never
received any Wages’. To add to the confusion, some of the
93 Carlo Ginzburg, ‘Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific
Method’, History Workshop Journal, no. 9 (1980); see also Francesca Trivellato, ‘Is
There a Future for Italian Microhistory in the Age of Global History?’, California
Italian Studies, ii (2011); Sidney Chalhoub, Viso˜es da liberdade: uma histo´ria das
u´ltimas de´cadas da escravida˜o na corte (Sa˜o Paulo, 1990).
94 Macleay numbered the testimony from the five suspected slaves together as items
29 and 30, FO 312/37, UKNA. Serena˜o was also unable to specify how long he had
been enslaved, so his sense of his past had also been constricted or distorted.
95 On intentionality, consciousness and resistance, see Comaroff and Comaroff, Of
Revelation and Revolution, vol. i, p. 29.
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witnesses had received wages as slaves, prior to being sold to
Silveira. Valente had been a carpenter, paying half of his
earnings to his master, one Senhor Matias, lieutenant at the
Arsenal at Mozambique Island.96
Even the existence of documentation did not produce a
definitive answer. When the judges, Moniz and Frere, showed
each marine a manumission letter supposedly signed by
Silveira, each insisted that the document was a passport
instead. Perhaps the witnesses were expressing their discontent
at the lack of change in their treatment since being legally
manumitted. After all, the manumission papers stated that they
‘would possess freely [livremente] everything that belongs to them,
in the same way as somebody born from a free womb [ventre
livre]’.97 Marines sailing from a Portuguese enclave
encountered similar problems to libertos and livres in Brazil
regarding the legal, representative and material distinctions
between their statuses and that of slaves and the freeborn.
When Frere tried to define the slaves’ legal status according
to documentary descriptions, the slaves used that definition
to further complicate the binary between enslavement and
free labour.
Perhaps two acts of dissimulation had occurred. The captain
was cheating his crew: he had promised wages and liberty to the
crew, but withheld them while they were working on board,
treating them effectively like chattel slaves and storing the
manumission papers as proof to a potential captor that he had
no slaves on board. The crew, in retaliation, was deceiving their
captain and the court: they denied the evidentiary value of the
manumission papers and focused the court’s attention on the
outstanding wages. The evidence of slave trading was therefore
inconclusive and the judges restored the ship to da Silveira,
96 Slaves earned wages through hiring out their labour and paying a share of the
income to their owner, which was a common feature in port towns including Lourenc¸o
Marques, Salvador and ironically Cape Town: see Andrew Bank, ‘The Erosion of
Urban Slavery at the Cape’, in Worden and Crais (eds.), Breaking the Chains, 82.
97 See manumission paper for Sabino, Izidoro and Joa˜o Maria (Mozambique, 18
Dec. 1843), item 15; and manumission paper for Antonio Valente, Joa˜o Cadete,
Francisco Serena˜o and Patricio (Mozambique, 19 July 1844), item 16, FO 312/37,
UKNA.
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with the captors liable for costs amounting to an eye-watering
£2,430. 8s.98
The difficulty in rendering determinate judgments based on
conjectural facts pushed the judges towards contingent
decision-making. There is a legal correlate to Kopytoff’s point
that slaves are in constant tension between commoditization and
individualization: the legal status of slaves fluctuated between
legislative definitions and Africans’ demands, and was only ever
fixed at the moment of transfer from slave ship to captor (as prize
negro) and from captor to territorial state (as liberated African).
That tension produced unintended consequences. The court did
not restore the crew immediately to the captain. Instead, the judge
asked each one what they wished to do next: return to the Unia˜o or
stay in Cape Town as a ‘free man’?99 Sabino and Serena˜o decided
to remain; the others, to return to the Unia˜o, presumably thinking
that they had taught Silveira a lesson. The crew of the Unia˜o had
accessed the precise part of legal status — consent to decide
future work and settlement arrangements — withheld from
liberated Africans by the abolition treaties.100 By casting doubt
on the evidential link between a labour regime and socio-legal
status, the marines forced Frere to interpret ‘liberated African’
status as the attribution of personal choice over work and
settlement rather than as the prerogative of colonial jurisdiction.
The Unia˜o case reveals the perverse and unintended dynamic
by which the mixed-commission court was more disposed to
condemn a ship without any slaves than one with passengers or
crew of ambiguous status, but would also insist on freeing ‘slaves’
even when deciding to restore ships. The court may have
98 Cape Town Slave Trade Commission, minute book, 1843–59, British and
Portuguese, FO 312/24, UKNA. It is also possible, but less likely, that the captors
had stretched the evidence regarding what the five marines had said in order to bolster
a flimsy prize case; but if so, it failed because judges decided on restoration on the
grounds of the ship’s innocent fittings rather than the possible enslaved status of the
Africans on board. For costs, see the second entry for 17 Jan. 1845.
99 The precise meaning of ‘free’ and its inflections in Portuguese are also lost to the
historian in this phrase. That said, neither Sabino nor Serena˜o appeared in the
Government Gazette lists as available for apprenticeship between October 1844 and
May 1845, nor did they appear on lists that stipulated hirers’ requirement to present
their apprentices to Field or a magistrate at the end of their apprenticeship in 1847 or
1848 (when a three-year apprenticeship would have ended).
100 See Natalie Zemon Davis’s concept of the impostor’s ‘out’. Natalie Zemon
Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 60; Natalie Zemon
Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France
(Stanford, Calif., 1987).
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continued that dynamic due to suspicion amongst its British staff
about whether a new law in Portuguese colonies in Africa that
converted slaves into apprenticed servic¸ais was merely a legal
veneer for continuing the slave trade around the Cape.101 In
1858, the court restored the Flor de Mozambique but gave its ten
apprenticed African workers the choice to remain in Cape Town
(which they did), and in 1862, the court restored the Flor de
Cabac¸eira but freed its two possible slaves.102
Four years after the Unia˜o’s alleged slaves negotiated their way
out of service to the captain, a group of liberated Africans in
Salvador used their status to develop their own conceptions of
independence. In 1848, there were seventy-five liberated Africans
working in the Arsenal, fifty of whom were servants and oarsmen
on saveiros, small launches used to transport goods from ships to
the dock. Eleven were skilled labourers and possibly literate, since
they were working in the offices of various departments of the
Arsenal, such as under the direction of the mason and
ironmonger.103 It is not clear when the group arrived at Salvador,
or if they had arrived together.104 But they had certainly attracted
the attention of the local police inspector, the subdelegado, because
101 For an overview of how the law worked, see Stephen J. Rockel, ‘New Labor
History in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial Enslavement and Forced Labor’,
International Labor and Working-Class History, lxxxvi (2014); Eric Allina, Slavery by
Any Other Name: African Life under Company Rule in Colonial Mozambique
(Charlottesville, Va., 2012), 4.
102 See minute book for the Mixed Commission, 1862, FO 312/25, UKNA. The
mixed-commission court seems to be characterized more by its contingency than by
being a ‘farce’. Christopher Saunders, ‘A Nineteenth Century Farce: The Anglo-
Portuguese Mixed Commission at the Cape of Good Hope’, Quarterly Bulletin of the
South African Library, xxxvii (1983); J. P. van Niekerk, ‘British, Portuguese, and
American Judges in Adderley Street: The International Legal Background to and
Some Judicial Aspects of the Cape Town Mixed Commissions for the Suppression
of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Part 1)’, Comparative and
International Law Journal of Southern Africa, xxxvii (2004); J. P. van Niekerk, ‘British,
Portuguese, and American Judges on Adderley Street: The International Legal
Background to and Some Judicial Aspects of the Cape Town Mixed Commissions
for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Part
2)’, Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, xxxvii (2004);
Niekerk, ‘British, Portuguese, and American Judges in Adderley Street (Part 3)’.
103 Presideˆncia da Provı´ncia, Militares, Intendeˆncia da Marinha, 1826–1859,
Mac¸o 3254, APEB.
104 According to the TSTD, the Santone (ID 4683) is the slave ship whose
interception fell closest to the events in the Arsenal. The British Navy intercepted
the ship in 1845, disembarking 651 slaves in Bahia.
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he reported their disruptions of the prevailing culture of slavery to
the secretary of police, Joa˜o Joaquim da Silva, creating an archival
trail of disagreement between state agencies regarding the
management of liberated Africans. The secretary wrote a
blustering report to the President of the Province, Joa˜o Jose´ de
Moura Magalha˜es, in which he claimed that ‘at various times [the
liberated Africans] have caused disorder because they have
refused to accept that other Africans will not be seduced [by the
liberated Africans] and have [instead] denounced the liberated
Africans for practising witchcraft and for dealing with liberty’.105
According to the original complaint to the police, made by
slaveowner Querino Antonio, the liberated Africans had
disrupted the ‘public peace’ on three different occasions by
blocking streets, marching down the main streets of the parish
of Vı´toria armed with hunting equipment, and allegedly attacking
slaves who had refused to join them.106 In the covering letter to de
Moura Magalha˜es, the secretary of police had described the
liberated Africans as ‘Nagoˆ’, Yoruba speakers.107 The President
passed the case to the Steward of the Arsenal, Joa˜o Joaquim
Rapozo, demanding an explanation ‘urgently’.108
But the police’s explanation of liberated African behaviour in
terms of ethnicity told only half the story. In reply to the President,
Rapozo did not mention ‘Nagoˆs’ at all, and indeed sided with the
liberated Africans against the police:
and leaving aside . . . the vagueness of the accusations . . . on which it
suffices simply to reflect on the list of so many disorders that occur in this
105 Secretary of the Bahian Police to the President of the Province, 27 Mar. 1848,
Governo da Provı´ncia, Polı´cia (assuntos diversos), 1828–1849, Mac¸o 3113, APEB.
There are also references to the passage in Dale Torston Graden, From Slavery to
Freedom in Brazil: Bahia, 1835–1900 (Albuquerque, 2006), 110; Reis, Divining
Slavery and Freedom, 135.
106 Statement of Querino Antonio to Chief of Police [23 Mar. 1848], enclosed in
secretary of the Bahian Police to the President of the Province, 27 Mar. 1848, Governo
da Provı´ncia, Polı´cia (assuntos diversos), 1828–1849, Mac¸o 3113, APEB.
107 Joa˜o Jose´ Reis and Beatriz Mamigonian, ‘Nagoˆ and Mina: The Yoruba Diaspora
in Brazil’, in Toyin Falola and Matt D. Childs (eds.), The Yoruba Diaspora in the Atlantic
World (Bloomington, 2004); more generally, see David Eltis, ‘The Diaspora of Yoruba
Speakers, 1650–1865: Dimensions and Implications’, and Ann O’Hear, ‘The
Enslavement of Yoruba’, in Falola and Childs (eds.), The Yoruba Diaspora in the
Atlantic World.
108 See the handwritten note on the letter from secretary of the Bahian Police to the
President of the Province, 27 Mar. 1848, Governo da Provı´ncia, Polı´cia (assuntos
diversos), 1828–1849, Mac¸o 3113, APEB.
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City, without the Police ever intervening, and apprehending the
perpetrator . . . I would say to Your Excellency that on the part of this
Arsenal, there is not the slightest tolerance of faults or disorder, which the
Africans could commit outside of working hours; however, when any
[fault] is brought to my attention I order it to be punished, as well as
anyone who misses the call at 8 p.m. to be registered and locked in to
their accommodation.109
Since witchcraft in this case was an accusation, perhaps the
evidence is best seen as an attempt by the police to wrest
control over the liberated Africans from their rival authorities in
the Arsenal. Liberated Africans were a valuable resource but also
an unstable one because the law did not permit the authorities to
use the threat of re-enslavement as punishment. The police
secretary’s invocation of ‘Nagoˆ’ identity as particularly
dangerous offered a way to circumvent this obstacle. In this
sense, the accusation of witchcraft was simply the reflection of a
fight over resources.
On the other hand, if the liberated Africans were participating in
some kind of ritual, it suggests that witchcraft was an alternative
to law as the link between the unique status of ‘liberated African-
ness’ and the labouring conditions that it caused.110 The
liberated Africans had a world view that tried to make sense of
the relationship between the physical conditions of their labour
and an invisible and inscrutable world of causations that resulted
in their apprenticeship in the Arsenal.111 Their understanding of
that relationship was an implicit repudiation of the claims in
abolition treaties and legislation that a liberated African’s legal
status was realized and respected through apprenticeship labour
for the state — witchcraft was a defence against the danger of
hirers’ consumption of wealth-in-people.112 The liberated
Africans invoked ambient protections as an alternative to the
ambient protections supposedly provided by bilateral treaties
109 Steward of the Arsenal to the President of the Province, 29 Mar. 1848, Governo
da Provı´ncia, Militares, Intendeˆncia da Marinha, 1847–1848, Mac¸o 3241, APEB.
110 But for a reading that emphasizes the possible ethnic dimensions of the spiritual
practices involved, see Reis, Divining Slavery and Freedom, 135.
111 See James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order
(Durham, N.C., 2006), 74; Luis Nicolau Pare´s, A formac¸a˜o do candomble´: histo´ria e
ritual da nac¸a˜o jeje na Bahia (Campinas, 2006), ch. 3.
112 Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-
America Is Evolving toward Africa (Boulder, 2012), ch. 7.
212 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 241
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/241/1/179/5134187 by U
niversity of C
am
bridge user on 16 January 2019
and municipal laws. They had inserted themselves into a space of
the city occupied by slaves and libertos. The liberated Africans had
undermined their separation from slaves that had been envisaged
in Brazilian legislation and they threatened to produce the kind of
disorder that had haunted Salvador since 1798. For the Steward,
Salvador and most importantly the liberated Africans themselves,
there was a real human cost to the witchcraft accusation: the
President overruled the Steward and punished the alleged
offenders by ordering their transfer to Rio de Janeiro in
December 1848.113
Deportation was the overreaction of a weak government
struggling to keep a grip on order within Salvador and along its
coastline. The police had previously had problems with African
saveiro pilots hiding weapons on the beaches as part of an alleged
conspiracy.114 The police and slaveowners such as Antonio were
trying to assert their domination over slaves and liberated
Africans whose cultural world views they did not fully
understand and whose labouring habits they could not contain
in legal definitions, as much as they tried. Liberated Africans’
trial-and-error practices of resistance afforded opportunities for
flight.115 One beneficiary of these practices in Salvador was Tom
Pepper.116 Pepper was a slave of Mina ethnicity, who
disembarked in Bahia probably sometime in August 1850. He
was then enslaved on a plantation called Valencixo, near
113 Intendeˆncia da Marinha to President of the Province, 22 Dec. 1848, Mac¸o
3242, APEB. Beatriz Mamigonian has traced some of the liberated Africans after
deportation in Beatriz Gallotti Mamigonian, ‘Do que ‘‘o preto mina’’ e´ capaz: etnia
e resisteˆncia entre africanos livres’, Afro-A´sia, xxiv (2000). For the human effects of
witchcraft in a different setting, see Lyndal Roper, The Witch in the Western Imagination
(Charlottesville, Va., 2012), ch. 4.
114 Chief of police of the 1st District to the President of the Province, and
Commander of Arms of the Province, 12 Dec. 1845, Governo da Provı´ncia, Polı´cia,
Correspondeˆncia recebida dos delegados, Capital e Interior, 1842–1889,Mac¸o 3001–
1, APEB.
115 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed (New Haven, 1998).
116 Details of the Pepper case are in Foreign Office, Fugitive Slave Commission:
reception of fugitive slaves on board British ships in foreign territorial waters, 1837–
1871, FO 84/1433, UKNA, fol. 268, and Mamigonian, ‘In the Name of Freedom’, 56.
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Cachoeira, probably growing tobacco.117 He made his daring
escape after seven months.118
Somehow, Pepper managed to make the eighty-seven-
kilometre journey to Morro de Sa˜o Paulo, where he attracted
the attention of HMS Conflict, whose commander, F. G. Drake,
took him on board. Pepper is recorded in the ship’s log as a ‘negro
[who] came on board [and] claimed protection’, which brought
into conflict the slaveowner’s right to property and the slave’s
moral claim to redefining his status as a liberated African rather
than an illegally-traded slave.119 What is striking is his method of
getting to the Conflict. According to the British consul at Rio de
Janeiro, Robert Hesketh, who interviewed him, Pepper used a
‘canoe’. It is unclear exactly what kind of boat Pepper used
because Hesketh needed ‘another negro’ to act as a translator,
but his exploitation of the vulnerabilities of the Bahian shoreline
and his willingness to jump into the status of being a liberated
African were similar to the actions of the liberated Africans in the
Arsenal. From the Conflict, he would probably have ended up as
one of the thousands of liberated Africans transported to the
Caribbean. His everyday labour would be similar to that in
Cachoeira, but at least with the promise of freedom from
apprenticeship after a fixed term.
The flight of liberated Africans from enslavement and
apprenticeship was not unique to Pepper: the whereabouts of
32–4 per cent of liberated Africans in Brazil was unknown
according to estimates taken in the 1860s, and a further 22–6
117 Pierre Verger first made the argument linking tobacco, sugar and the
transatlantic slave trade: see Pierre Verger, Flux et reflux de la traite des ne`gres entre le
Golfe de Be´nin et Bahia de Todos os Santos du XVII
e
au XIX
e
sie`cle (Paris, 1968), 34–46;
see also Falla que recitou o presidente da provincia da Bahia, o dezembargador conselheiro
Francisco Gonc¸alves Martins, n’abertura da Assemble´a Legislativa da mesma provincia em
4 de julho de 1849 (Bahia, 1849), 41; Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the
Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550–1835 (Cambridge, 1985), 83, for
tobacco production in Cachoeira. Ribeiro states that African potentates on the
Mina coast developed a taste for the low-grade Bahian tobacco that was prepared
using molasses: Ribeiro, ‘The Transatlantic Slave Trade to Bahia’, 141–2.
118 On Pepper’s origins and travel route, see Hesketh’s letter in FO 84/1433,
UKNA, fol. 268. Hesketh claims that ‘[Pepper’s] looks confirm this statement
[about his Mina origin]’. There is no perfect match in the TSTD for a ship that
Pepper was on, but the most probable matches are Mosquito (ID 4608), Brasil (ID
4609) or Igualdade (ID 4610).
119 Entry for 13 Mar. 1851, ship log of HMS Conflict, ADM 53/3856, UKNA.
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per cent had been freed from apprenticeship.120 Behind every
case of flight lay a story of a liberated African’s strategic use of
‘weapons of the weak’, such as protest, evading work and
negotiation, but only some, such as Pepper’s, left archival
traces.121 The decree in 1864 that ended all liberated African
apprenticeships was a direct inversion of the Ordenac¸o˜es
Filipinas: instead of blaming the slave for flight, the decree
stated that emancipation papers for every fugitive liberated
African would be stored for them to collect if and when their
locations were established.122 The decree was a recognition of
the contemporary state of affairs regarding liberated Africans’
choice and determination to live beyond the visibility of civil
law, rather than a change in the legal status of liberated Africans
or in state practice towards them. Largely through their own
efforts, liberated Africans rendered the schemes to re-export
them a dead letter. While international law in abolition treaties
and nationally-defined apprenticeship arrangements claimed to
define liberated Africans as a distinctive legal subject, the Africans
redefined what the legal code could control and authorize and
tried to stretch it to fit their own aspirations.
The law could have spun out different results, with the return
of the crew of the Unia˜o to the master, and the restoration of
Pepper, as chattel property, to his owner in Cachoeira. But the
abstract nature of ‘liberated African’ status made it amenable to
Africans’ own claims to a grounded theory of ‘protection’-in-
law: the Unia˜o crew and Pepper may have been treated
badly, but neither could claim that their lives were in
immediate danger, unlike the 420 slaves trapped behind the
grating on the Rio Mariangombe. But they presented British
and Brazilian judges, diplomats and naval squadrons with
sufficiently ambiguous cases to ensure that state officials took
their wishes into consideration in the immediate present, rather
than being suspended until a post-apprenticeship future.
120 For various estimates from some official and non-official contemporary reports,
see Mamigonian, ‘O direito de ser africano livre’, 144; Chalhoub, A forc¸a da escravida˜o,
313, n. 3.
121 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New
Haven, 1985).
122 Decreto 3310, 24 Sept. 1864: Colec¸a˜o das leis do Impe´rio do Brasil de 1864 (Rio de
Janeiro, 1864), tomo xxvii, parte ii, 160–1.
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IV
The legal status of liberated Africans as free labourers and
political subjects emerged through the intersection of an
international legal regime, local state practices and African
responses to that regime and those practices around the
Atlantic world. In Cape Town, this intersection propelled a
shift from the open abuse of liberated African labour in the
1820s to clearly delineated channels for Africans to lodge
complaints through the Collector of Customs in the 1840s. In
Salvador, the category of ‘liberated African’ was initially a
residual one that resulted from defiance of abolition treaties:
the state did little to ensure that slaves illegally transported to
Bahia after 1831 were liberated. But throughout the 1840s and
by the 1850s, state officials had developed monitoring practices
similar to those in Cape Town, such as tracking arrivals and
apprentices, to prove to Britain that liberated Africans were not
slaves. Liberated Africans in Cape Town probably had more
opportunity than those in Salvador to use the ‘weapons of the
strong’ — state instruments such as the court and officials such
as the Collector of Customs — to determine their futures in ways
faster than treaties and legislation envisaged. In Salvador,
Africans relied on the ‘weapons of the weak’, such as flight.
The difference in options available to liberated Africans in
Cape Town and Salvador probably came down to three
variables. First, there was the question of critical mass. In the
1840s, there were liberated Africans arriving in Cape Town
every two or three months, and so it is possible that the
Africans resident in the holding facility at Papendorp or in the
smallpox hospital could inform the next wave of arrivals about
using the court or the Collector of Customs as ways to make
claims about their futures — there was probably greater
awareness of the meanings and potentialities of status as a
liberated African. Second, the presence of mixed-commission
and vice-admiralty courts in Cape Town gave liberated Africans
an additional resource not open to their counterparts at Salvador;
the mixed-commission court must have seemed even more
accessible considering that it was located on Adderley Street,
adjacent to the lodge in the Company Gardens where liberated
Africans were sometimes held. Third, Capetonian state officials
and hirers were under pressure from the potential moral censure
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of metropolitan abolitionists and the potential legal and political
intervention by the metropolitan government to avoid the same
scandal that had beset the colony in the 1820s. There was no
analogous pressure at Salvador; indeed, the closest equivalent
was the British naval squadron’s posting along the Bahian
coast, which some Africans such as Pepper managed to use as a
means of escape.
What, then, was the precise legal status of liberated Africans in
the Atlantic world? Jenny Martinez has argued that slave-trade
suppression, and abolitionism more generally, bestowed human
rights upon former slaves.123 A softer version of this claim,
proposed by Beatriz Mamigonian and the late Patrick Harries,
has argued that liberated Africans claimed rights through court
processes.124 But the language of ‘humanity’ and the attribution
of rights were absent from the bilateral treaties and it is not clear
that liberated Africans made claims to rights, either against other
individuals or the state.125 As an alternative to rights-based
approaches, historians have carefully revealed how naval
squadrons saw liberated Africans as an opportunity to earn
prize money and how hirers saw liberated Africans as a cheap
source of apprenticed labour.126 Consequently, debate has
revolved around the extent to which anti-slave-trade legislation
re-enslaved liberated Africans, and therefore the extent to which
the same processes of ethnic survival or creolization, which
supposedly shaped slaves’ lives and choices for centuries, in
turn shaped liberated Africans’ lives and choices in making
sense of the profound rupture that they had experienced
through transatlantic displacement.127 But historians should
123 Martinez, ‘Antislavery Courts’; Martinez, Slave Trade and the Origins of
International Human Rights Law.
124 Mamigonian, ‘O direito de ser africano livre’; Harries, ‘ ‘‘Ideas of Liberty and
Freedom’’ ’, 174.
125 Martinez, ‘Antislavery Courts’; Martinez, Slave Trade and the Origins of
International Human Rights Law; Moyn, Last Utopia.
126 Scanlan, ‘Rewards of Their Exertions’; Emma Christopher, ‘ ‘‘Tis Enough That
We Give Them Liberty’’? Liberated Africans at Sierra Leone in the Early Era of Slave-
Trade Suppression’, in Burroughs and Huzzey (eds.), Suppression of the Atlantic Slave
Trade; McKenzie, Imperial Underworld, ch. 4.
127 The argument about ethnic survivals and creolization goes back to Melville
Herskovits and Sidney Mintz. See Melville J. Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past
(New York, 1941); Sidney W. Mintz and Richard Price, The Birth of African-American
Culture: An Anthropological Perspective (Boston, 1992); Adderley, ‘New Negroes from
Africa’, 235–6; Nelson, ‘Apprentices of Freedom’.
217LAW, ‘LIBERATED AFRICANS’ AND THE STATE
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/past/article-abstract/241/1/179/5134187 by U
niversity of C
am
bridge user on 16 January 2019
ask themselves if dusting off the scales to weigh survivals and
creolization gets us much purchase on how historical actors
understood the choices available. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot
put it, the paradigmatic expectation that Africans would be
‘either tabula rasa or mere carriers of tradition’ tries to give
historical meaning to slaves; but these alternatives do not probe
deep enough in understanding the profound political, social and
legal brutalities wreaked on enslaved people, or the consequent
precarities in their post-emancipation status.128
This article has unpacked an alternative approach, defining
liberated Africans’ legal status in terms of unguaranteed
entitlements. Liberated Africans used unguaranteed entitlements
to make claims about status (‘I am not chattel’) and about possible
futures (‘I shall support myself through witchcraft or flight rather
than through waged apprenticeship’). Although unguaranteed
entitlements theoretically had the same remit anywhere in the
Atlantic under anti-slave-trade law, their success as claims
varied hugely depending on local context, state personnel and
the resources at the disposal of liberated Africans in each
particular case.
Many historians have innovatively researched the ways in
which ‘history as process’ made the Atlantic a coherent region
in the early modern period.129 European colonization of the New
World, the transatlantic slave trade and the growth of new states
through warfare and revolution in America, Haiti and West Africa
brought the four continents together until 1830.130 The
continued vigour of the slave trade after 1830 prompted British
attempts to reorder the seas, coasts and ports around the Atlantic
128 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ‘North Atlantic Universals: Analytical Fictions, 1492–
1945’, South Atlantic Quarterly, ci (2002), 855; for similar arguments, see Vincent
Brown, The Reaper’s Garden: Death and Power in the World of Atlantic Slavery
(Cambridge, Mass., 2008), 8; Diana Paton, The Cultural Politics of Obeah: Religion,
Colonialism and Modernity in the Caribbean World (Cambridge and New York, 2015),
intro.
129 Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge, Mass. and
London, 2005), 41.
130 Other key texts in the field of Atlantic history include J. H. Elliott, Empires of the
Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830 (New Haven, 2006); Joseph
C. Miller, ‘Introduction: Atlantic Ambiguities of British and American Abolition’,
William and Mary Quarterly, lxvi (2009); David Armitage and M. J. Braddick (eds.),
The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800 (Basingstoke, 2009); Matthew Brown and
Gabriel Paquette (eds.), Connections after Colonialism: Europe and Latin America in
the 1820s (Tuscaloosa, 2013).
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as legal spaces of slave-trade suppression. The result, particularly
from 1839 onwards, was increasingly aggressive British unilateral
action, and a consequent influx of liberated Africans into the
Cape and Brazil. The problems and possibilities that their
unguaranteed entitlements raised remind us that the Atlantic
Ocean continued to form a horizon across the nineteenth century.
University of Cambridge Jake Christopher Richards
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